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Abstract 
Do elected representatives have a time-constant representation focus or do they adapt their 
focus depending on election proximity? In this paper, we examine this overlooked theoretical 
and empirical puzzle by looking at how reelection-seeking actors adapt their legislative 
behavior according to the electoral cycle. In parliamentary democracies, representatives need 
to serve two competing principals: their party and their district. Our analysis hinges on how 
representatives make a strategic use of parliamentary written questions in a highly party 
constrained institutional context to heighten their reselection and reelection prospects. Using 
an original dataset of over 32000 parliamentary questions tabled by Portuguese representatives 
from 2005 to 2015, we examine how time interacts with two keys explanatory elements: 
electoral vulnerability and party size. Results show that representation focus is not static over 
time and, in addition, that electoral vulnerability and party size shape strategic use of 
parliamentary questions.  
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Introduction  
Do elected representatives have a time-constant representation focus or do they adapt 
their focus depending on election proximity? In this paper we address this overlooked 
theoretical and empirical puzzle by examining how representatives use parliamentary questions 
to serve their competing principals ± their districts and their party ± over time. The effect of 
election proximity has been extensively examined in US literature, particularly for roll-call 
voting (Amacher and Boyes, 1978) and bill sponsoring (Fenno, 1982; Kessler and Krehbiel, 
1996). Using an original dataset with over 32.000 parliamentary questions in Portugal for a 
period of three legislatures (2005-2015), our main argument is that representatives in 
parliamentary democracies make a strategic use of their prerogative of tabling questions over 
the course of the electoral cycle.1  
Our original contribution hinges on the interaction of time with electoral vulnerability 
and party size. By analyzing how representatives with different electoral vulnerability and from 
parties of different sizes ask questions to the government, we disentangle the incentives to shirk 
and to free-ride on the parliamentary SDUW\JURXS¶VFROOHFWLYHHIIRUWWREXLOGDUHSXWDWLRQ (Cox 
and McCubbins, 2005). The latter is instrumental for reelection purposes, particularly in 
Portugal, where there is no individual representation of candidates in the ballot. Under those 
circumstances, representatives have to channel their individual prerogatives, such as 
parliamentary questions, towards building an attractive party label. This need is particularly 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, we use tabling and asking interchangeability. 
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heightened for electorally vulnerable representatives. As for party size, the bigger the party 
structure, the higher the incentives to shirk and free-ride, if for nothing else, because of the 
LQFUHDVLQJO\KLJKFRVWVIRUWKHOHDGHUVKLSWRPRQLWRUWKHLUPHPEHUV¶EHKDYLRU     
 Results suggest that time plays an important role in explaining the focus of 
representation. Representatives adapt their behavior strategically, depending not only on their 
personal electoral circumstances (electoral vulnerability), the structure in which they are 
embedded (party size), but also the moment of the electoral cycle (election proximity).  
Representatives and Parties in Parliamentary Democracies 
Political parties are the most important organizational unit of political life in 
parliamentary democracies, through which the citizenry (the principals) select representatives 
(the agents) to act on their behalf and hold them accountable (Müller, 2000). In legislatures, 
parties help reduce transaction costs, facilitate the coordination of information acquisition and 
dissemination, and promote the division of labor (Aldrich, 7KH\SOD\³DQLPSRUWDQWUROH
in selecting presiding officers, in allocating legislators to committees, and to leadership 
positions within committees, and in shaping the agenda for consideration of bills and other 
PHDVXUHV´ (Rasch, 1999: 123). 
Typically, the division of labor inside parliamentary party groups is intimately 
connected with committee organization. Two examples illustrate this. In Belgium, De Winter 
DQG'XPRQWVD\WKDWSDUWLHV³RUJDQL]HDWRXUG¶KRUL]RQ during their weekly parliamentary party 
group meeting, during which committee members orally present the main topics that will be 
GLVFXVVHGDQGGHFLGHGE\WKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFRPPLWWHH´ ,Q6ZHGHQ³WKHLQWHUQDO
division of labor corresponds to the Riksdag committee system. This means that committee 
assignments have an impact on who is responsible for specific subject areas within the party 
JURXS´+DJHYL7KHSDUW\¶VOHDGHUVKLSLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHDOORFDWLRQRIPHPEHUV
to committees, taking into consideration preferences, seniority, and position in the party 
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hierarchy (Fernandes, 2016). In return, parties expect members to specialize in policy areas 
and to deliver information to SDUW\¶VPHGLDQOHJLVODWRU to curb uncertainty in policy outcomes 
(Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987), acquiring and disseminating information at the intra-party level 
with minimum agency loss (Kiewet and McCubbins, 1991).  
Representatives have three paramount goals: to be reelected, to have influence on the 
chamber, and to extract good public policy (Fenno, 1973). More recently, Kam reminds us that 
³SROLWLFLDQV GHVLUH D FRPELQDWLRQ RI SROLF\ LQIOXHQFH RIILFH SHUNV DQG YRWHV´ DQG WKDW UH-
HOHFWLRQLVDPHDQVWRDQHQGZKLFKPD\EHD³GHVLUHWRVHUYHWKHLUFRPPXQLWLes or to make a 
GLIIHUHQFH EXW LW PD\ DOVR LQYROYH VHFXULQJ D SDUWLFXODU SROLF\ RXWFRPH´  -22). 
5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV GHYLVH VWUDWHJLHV WR KHOS WKHP ³PRVW VXFFHVVIXOO\ DQG HIILFLHQWO\ DFW WR
PD[LPL]H WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI ZKDWHYHU RXWFRPHV WKH\ IDYRXU´ 6WUøm, 1997: 158). Those 
strategies are influenced by the institutional setting in which representatives operate.  
In parliamentary democracies, political parties hold the monopoly of candidate 
selection (Sartori, 1976). Consequently, to be successful in reelection, representatives need, 
first, to succeed in being re-selected by the party selectorate (Strøm, 1997). Additionally, 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVQHHGWRKDYH³DFFHVVWRWKHSDUW\ODEHODQGLWVSULYLOHJHVLQFDPSDLJQLQJDQG
WKH HOHFWRUDO SURFHVV´ (Sieberer, 2006: 154). The pivotal role of political parties for the 
reelection process, which is instrumental for the attainment of policy influence and sway in the 
chamber, makes them the leading principal for representatives. As Carey states ³YLUWXDOO\DOO
legislators are subject to influence by at least one principal: their legislative party leadership. 
Whether they are subject to pressure from other, competing principals depends on the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WLQZKLFKWKH\RSHUDWH´ 
Electoral rules help explDLQ WKH FHQWUDOLW\ RI SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV IRU UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶
VWUDWHJLHV7KH\GHWHUPLQHWKHLQFHQWLYHVWRFXOWLYDWHDSHUVRQDOYRWHGHILQHGDV³WKDWSDUWRI
WKHOHJLVODWRU¶VYRWHWKDWLVEDVHGRQKLVRUKHULQGLYLGXDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRUUHFRUG´6KXJDUWHt 
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al., 2005: 437). In some electoral contexts, for example STV systems, representatives have not 
only to compete at the inter-party level, but also the intra-party level (Katz, 1986). In the latter, 
representatives have to cater their constituency to earn YRWHUV¶VXSSRUWDWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKHLU
fellow party members (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Thus, being re-selected by the party is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for re-election, which has implications for 
parliamentary strategies. For example, the Irish STV electoral system, heightens the likelihood 
for representatives to table parliamentary questions related to their constituency to signal to 
voters that they are looking after their interests (Martin, 2011).  
Conversely, in closed-list proportional systems, where the party holds the monopoly 
for selecting and ranking candidates, being re-selected might be a sufficient condition. In this 
case, the party leadership becomes the leading principal to which representatives have to work 
for. Because in these contexts electoral competition is reduced to an inter-party dimension, 
there is a decrease in the incentives for representatives to deliver constituency-focused benefits 
(Carey and Shugart, 1995). 
The competition between party and district for represHQWDWLYHV¶ IRFXV is further 
mitigated by district magnitude and electoral vulnerability. The former affects the likelihood 
that representatives will shirk and free-ULGHRQWKHLUIHOORZFDQGLGDWHV¶HIIRUWV7KHKLJKHUWKH
district magnitude, the less costly for a candidate to focus on her own goals while other party 
candidates are working to deliver public goods, particularly in non-preferential systems 
(Bowler and Farrell, 1993). Moreover, electoral vulnerability will also play a role in the extent 
to which representatives are willing to serve their party or their constituents (Cain et al., 1987). 
$FFRUGLQJ WR$QGUp HW DO ³OHJLVODWRUV LQ VDIH VHDWVZLOO EH WKH ILUVW WR VKLUN DQG IUHH ULGH
Legislators in marginal seats, by contrast, will be most motivated to overcome any shirking or 
free-riding, even if the gains from their constituency effort are limited by the electoral 
LQVWLWXWLRQV´ 
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Parliamentary Questions as Indicators of Representatives¶ Foci 
For a long time overlooked, parliamentary questions have recently received more 
DWWHQWLRQIURPWKHOHJLVODWLYHVFKRODUV¶FRPPXQLW\Labelled foremost as a scrutiny tool, they 
are in fact a cornerstone of non-legislative activities in legislatures and their uses are manifold. 
Representatives use them for a wide range of purposes: to request information from the 
executive, to gain publicity, to surf a wave of anti-governmental popular sentiment, to foster 
their reputation on a particular policy field, as well as for strategic electoral signals to the 
selectorate and the electorate (Wiberg, 1995; Russo and Wiberg, 2010; Bailer, 2011; Proksch 
and Slapin, 2011). Additionally, parliamentary questions are an inexpensive tool for what 
Saalfeld (2000a) dubs of fire-alarm oversight. Although not always focusing on the big stories, 
parliamentary questions constitute an effective vehicle for opposition parties to collate detailed 
information and thereby build a wealth of material on a wide range of issues (Sánchez de Dios 
and Wiberg, 2011). Further, recent work has emphasized their importance to influence the 
public agenda (Green-Pedersen, 2010). Parliamentary questions can also be used effectively 
by representatives to signal dissent from the official party line in a variety of institutional 
contexts (Leston-Bandeira, 2009). In short, as Rozenberg and Martin state, ³ZKDWis striking is 
the diversity of uses of parliamentary questions explaining why they KDYH JUHDW ³KHXULVWLF
SRWHQWLDO´ (2011: DVWKH\FDQEHDYHU\JRRGLQVLJKWLQWROHJLVODWRUV¶EHKDYLRU 
The variety of ways in which parliamentary questions are used reflects their versatility 
as a legislative tool. As Sánchez and Wiberg demonstrate, there are almost as many types and 
combinations of parliamentary questions as legislative institutional arrangements (2010: 218-
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221). Although the UK Prime Minister¶s Question Time (PMQs) is the most well-known type 
of parliamentary questions, they are but typical of this scrutiny tool. PMQs are the prime of 
what oral questions in the plenary can offer in terms of visibility, theatre and political scoring. 
But in reality the vast majority of parliamentary questions are written questions, unknown to 
most people. As Green-Pedersen VWDWHV ³(w)ritten questions, the vast majority in most 
FRXQWULHVUDUHO\UHFHLYHPXFKGLUHFWDWWHQWLRQ´ (2010: 350). Whilst oral questions may have 
some visibility, written questions tend to have barely any and to focus on specific policy issues, 
according to government departments, often verging on the highly technical.  
Typically, extant literature on parliamentary questions hinges on the assumption that 
these are inherently individual-level legislative tools (Wiberg, 1995). For example, Rozenberg 
DQG0DUWLQFODLPWKDW³SDUOLDPHQWDU\TXHVWLRQVDUHDPRQJVWWKHPRVWVLQFHUHPHDVXUHVRIZKDW
LQWHUHVWVOHJLVODWRUVIUHHIURPSDUW\FRQWURO´ In highly constrained institutional 
environments, such as the Portuguese one as we shall see below, these constitute therefore 
unique tools whereby parties offer legislators leeway not only to select topics, but also to 
choose when to use them.  
Literature on the internal organization of parliamentary party groups, however, disputes 
the assumption that parliamentary questions are inherently individual tools, unconstrained from 
SDUW\FRQWURO,Q*HUPDQ\IRUH[DPSOH³TXHVWLRQVZKLFKKDYHQRWEHHQWDEOHGDVDUHVXOWRI
DQH[SOLFLWGHFLVLRQRIWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\SDUW\JURXS¶Vcaucus are expected to be cleared with 
WKHUHOHYDQWSDUW\ZRUNLQJJURXSVH[HFXWLYHFRPPLWWHHVDQGZKLSV¶RIILFHV´ (Saalfeld, 2000b: 
27). SimilarlyLQWKH1HWKHUODQGV³SDUOLDPHQWDU\SDUWLHVDOVRUHTXLUHWKHLUPHPEHUVWRVHHN
permission before making use of individual parliamentary rights, such as putting a written 
TXHVWLRQWRDPLQLVWHU´$QGHZHJ, 2000: 99, italic in the original). 
In this article, we build on the assumption that parliamentary questions are an individual 
instrument that representatives use in coordination with the party leadership aiming at 
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maximizing collective benefits to the party (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Such assumption 
KLQJHVRQWKHLGHDWKDW³WKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\DQGH[WUD-parliamentary party leadership will expect 
WKHPHPEHU¶V OR\DOW\DQGGLOLJHQWVHUYLFH LQDYDULHW\RIDUHQDV´6WU¡P, 1997: 162). Party 
reputation is of particular importance in non-preferential electoral systems in which voters cast 
a ballot for a party label. According to Cox and 0F&XEELQV³WKHPRUHIDYRUDEOHLVWKH>«@
SDUW\¶VUHFRUGRIOHJLVODWLYHDFFRPSOLVKPHQWWKHEHWWHULWVUHSXWDWLRQRUEUDQGQDPHZLOOEH´
(Cox and McCubbins, 5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶LQGLYLGXDOSDUOLDPHQWDU\TXHVWLRQVZLOOKHOS
FHPHQWWKHSDUW\¶VUHSXWDWLon, to acquire and disseminate information to the median legislator, 
and to balance information asymmetry between the government and the opposition, particularly 
as elections approach and opposition parties strive for information for the electoral campaign. 
8OWLPDWHO\ ³WKH EHWWHU >«@ WKH SDUW\¶V EUDQG QDPH WKH EHWWHU ZLOO EH WKH SURVSHFWV IRU
UHHOHFWLRQ´&R[DQG0F&XEELQV, 2005: 7).  
 
Competing Principals in the Portuguese Parliament 
The Portuguese parliament, the Assembleia da República, is a party based legislature. 
Representatives are first and foremost expected to be delegates of their party, whereby the link 
between elected officials and voters is done via the party (Converse and Pierce, 1986; Pequito 
Teixeira, 2009). The legislature is composed of 230 representatives, who are elected through a 
SURSRUWLRQDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ FORVHG OLVW V\VWHP DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH G¶+RQGW KLJKHVW DYHUDJH
method. Portuguese representatives are therefore elected through lists determined by their 
parties. When a voter goes to the ballot box, they see a list of party symbols ± no specific name 
of deputies is indicated. People explicitly vote for the party. The country is divided into 22 
separate districts. Division by districts, however, merely exists for administrative reasons.  
Similar to France (Costa et al., 2012), the Portuguese representative mandate is a 
national one. Constituencies as such have no meaning in the Portuguese political ethos. Not 
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only does the word and associated meaning do not exist in Portuguese, but also the Constitution 
specifically states that deputies represent the whole country rather than their specific districts 
(Art. 152). Accordingly, deputies elected through, for instance, Lisbon or Porto, should have 
the same mandate. Besides this, the constitution also specifically forbids regionally based 
parties (Art. 51) and simultaneously confers to the party the monopoly on representation in the 
legislature. Additionally, resources and parliamentary rights are allocated to parliamentary 
JURXSVWKHSDUW\¶VIDFHWLQWKHOHJLVODWXUHUDWKHUWKDQOHJLVODWRUVConsequently, parliamentary 
activity provides a privileged channel to communicate to voters, as well as to explain party 
policy preferences.  
The highly constrained party environment notwithstanding, there is a twofold incentive 
for representatives to focus on their district. First, legislators often also have local 
representative mandates ± again a similarity with French cumul de mandats (Blais, 2006), 
whereby national representatives accumulate this role with positions in the local government 
structure. Second, thanks to a well embedded system of substitutions which involves temporary 
mandate suspensions, well-known local representatives, including Mayors, are able take on 
their mandate in the legislature, where they have incentives to table questions for their districts. 
Crucially, Portuguese representatives can put forward as many written questions to the 
government as they wish. This is one of the few parliamentary rights ascribed to legislators 
individually and not constrained by a party quota. Whereas oral questions to the government 
are ascribed to parliamentary groups according to their size ± giving groups full control of who 
asks what - written questions are submitted by representatives individually. Whilst 
parliamentary groups have overall supervision of the type of areas that require detailed 
questioning, deputies are also able to submit their own questions.  
Parliamentarians use different types of questions to suit different circumstances and 
purposes. In particular, written questions assist representatives in asking far more precise and 
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well backed-up questions than oral questions would enable them to. Written questions are 
therefore dually important: they give a new vehicle for parties to present their policy 
preferences to voters and they introduce a more flexible tool whereby deputies have flexibility 
of action regardless of their parties. As Rozenberg and colleagues have shown, questions to the 
government can give a valuable insight into UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶EHKDYLRUXQYHLOLQJSROLF\DQG
foci preferences (Rozenberg et al., 2011). This is particularly important in the context of the 
top-down, party-focused, type of structure that permeates the organization of Portuguese 
parliamentary groups.  
Representatives SDUWRIWKHJURXS¶VGLUHFWRUDWH± president of the group, vice-presidents, 
policy coordinators ± constitute what would often be referred to as frontbenchers.2 These 
constitute the well-known faces of each parliamentary group, those the public would recognize 
from press conferences, speaking on television, in short the faces personifying their parties. In 
small parliamentary groups, such as the Left Bloc (BE), the Portuguese Communist Party 
(PCP-PEV) or the Christian Democratic Party (CDS-PP), they represent most of the group. But 
in the larger parties, such as the Socialist Party (PS) or the right-liberal Social Democrat Party 
(PSD), they can only constitute at the most a third of the parliamentary group. The other two 
thirds are representatives with considerably reduced visibility and level of responsibility. 
7DNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKDW³FRQVWLWXHQF\ZRUN´DV such does not really punctuate the activity of 
a Portuguese representative, it soon becomes clear that there is here a job-gap to be filled in; 
which is neither the frontline action, nor pursuing local constituents¶ issues. This is where 
written questions can become a useful tool for parliamentary activity, but also to help us 
understand the subtleties of the pressures exercised by competing principals such as party and 
local districts.  
 
                                                          
2
 The formal distinction between frontbenchers and backbenchers does not have formal existence in Portugal.  
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Hypotheses 
The theoretical framework outlined above leads to several empirically testable 
hypotheses. First, we start by looking at the effect of electoral vulnerability on legislators¶
incentives to focus primarily on the district or on their party in their parliamentary questioning 
activities. Following André et al. (2015), our expectation is that those representatives who have 
been elected in safe seats will table fewer parliamentary questions with a district focus. Such 
expectation is based on the idea that representatives who have a higher certainty in their re-
election will have more incentives to free-ride and to contribuWHOHVVIRUWKHSDUW\¶VFROOHFWLYH
good (Olson, 1965), i.e., the grassroots work at the district level. Those legislators will privilege 
to serve the party as their main principal, to ensure that their privileged position in the electoral 
list remains untouched. Conversely, legislators who have previously been placed by the party 
leadership in a relatively unsafe position, will focus on serving the district to heighten the 
SDUW\¶VDJJUHJDWHHOHFWRUDOSURVSHFWVDQGLQWXUQKHOSWKHLURZQUHHOHFWLRQ7KLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\
important for closed-list proportional representation systems, like Portugal, where party labels 
are the sole electoral heuristics for voters.  
 
H1: The lower their electoral vulnerability, the more likely representatives will table party 
focused parliamentary questions.  
 
Second, we look at the effect of the size of the parliamentary party group on the 
incentives for legislators to focus on serving their district or their party in parliamentary 
questions. Panebianco (1988) observed that size impacts party organizational structures and 
bureaucratization, reflected in labor division within parliamentary party groups (Heidar and 
Koole, 2000). The size of the organization is important to understand the transaction costs 
associated with decision-making (Nooteboom, 1993). Inherently, small parties do not have 
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enough scale for specialization because there are simply not enough members to deal with the 
institutional workload. In those parties the hierarchical dividing line between frontbenchers 
and backbenchers is much more blurred than in larger parliamentary party groups. Our 
expectation is for the size of parliamentary party groups to have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of representatives to focus on district service. Two reasons explain this. First, larger 
groups promote shirking and free-riding, decreasing the incentives of its members to help the 
formation of collective goods through information acquisition and dissemination to the median 
legislator. Rather, under these circumstances, representatives will have more incentives to 
focus on their district. Second, an iQFUHDVHLQWKHJURXS¶VVL]HZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHFRVWVIRUWKH
parliamentary leadership to keep tabs on individual behavior, which, in turn, further facilitates 
free-riding.  
 
H2: The larger the size of the parliamentary party group, the more incentives for 
representatives to table a district focused parliamentary question.  
 
Third, we introduce a time-dynamic approach to parliamentary questions. Extant 
literature shows that election proximity changes legislators¶EHKDYLRUE\PDNLQJWKHPPRUH
focused on the principal holding the key to their reelection (Elling, 1982; Thomas, 1985; 
/LQGVWDGWHWDO)RUH[DPSOH)HQQRVKRZVWKDWLQWKH86³WKHUROO-call or other policy-
related behavior of senator changes in the direction of policy sentiments of their electorate as 
WKHLUUHHOHFWLRQDSSURDFKHV´)HQQR:HEXLOGRQWKLVOLWHUDWXUHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKH
effect of election proximity in written questions. Our overall expectation is that representatives 
will adapt their behavior over time by making a strategic use of parliamentary questions. This 
should work as a moderating effect of electoral vulnerability and party size.  
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First, we expect election proximity to encourage legislators with high vulnerability to 
make more district-focused questions. To be sure, those legislators will have more incentives 
to work for the party label as a collective good and to signal at the district level that they are 
concerned with the electorate (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). In a different vein, legislators with 
low electoral vulnerability will face no risk of not getting reelected. Thus, they will have lower 
incentives to work for their district. In fact, low electoral vulnerability positions are reserved 
to frontbenchers, who, as election day approaches, will be responsible, for example, to use the 
OHJLVODWLYH DUHQD WR EXLOG WKH SDUW\¶V QDWLRQDO SURILOH DQG UHWULHYH LQIRUPDWLRQ IURP WKH
government and the bureaucracy for electoral purposes. 
Second, electoral proximity has a different impact depending on the size of the 
parliamentary party group. In all parties, as election day approaches, the parliamentary 
leadership needs to prepare for the elections, getting involved in coordination activities, 
supporting party leadership drafting the manifesto, and so forth. As Farrell and Webb underline 
³FKDQJHVLQFDPSDLJQSHUVRQQHOUHIOHFWDJHQHUDOVKLIWLQWKHLQWHUQDOSRZHUUHODWLRQVZLWKLQ
parties, with the parliamentary face ± and especially that part of it intimately associated with 
the party leadership ± emerging as the main poZHU KRXVH´ (2000: 121). Thus, there is an 
increase in opportunity costs as election day approaches, in that the parliamentary leadership 
must decide whether to devote its human resources and time to monitor backbenchers or to 
invest in campaign activities (Shepsle et al., 2009). We assume that the leadership chooses to 
focus on campaign activities. Consequently, its institutional capacity to keep tabs on 
backbenchers will be weakened as election day approaches, paving the way for the latter to 
shirk and free-ride more easily. Inherently, in small parties the labor division between front- 
and backbenchers will be blurred because they are short on personnel. By and large, in big 
parties there is a clear-cut division between the parliamentary leadership and the backbenchers. 
As election day approaches, the former will be increasingly more involved in campaign 
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activities and less in everyday business in parliament. The latter will not only free themselves 
from leadership control, but also will have a job-gap to fill in, with the decreasing importance 
of parliamentary activities as elections approach.   
 
H3a: The fewer the days to the next general election, the more likely that 
representatives with low electoral vulnerability will table question focusing on their party.  
H3b: The fewer the days to the next general election, the higher the incentives for 
representatives of big parties to shirk and free-ride by tabling a question focusing on their 
district.  
 
Data and Methods 
These hypotheses are tested using all parliamentary written questions over three 
legislative periods in Portugal ± 2005-09, 2009-11, and 2011-15. Our original dataset includes 
a total of 32,011 parliamentary questions. Data has been retrieved from official records 
available online in the Portuguese legislatXUH¶VZHEVLWH Our time period allows us to account 
not only for the potential effects of the 2007 parliament reform, but also for changes in the 
ideological nature of the executive and the majority size. There were multiple power 
constellations of government over these three legislative periods. In 2005, the Socialists held 
an absolute majority, followed by a plurality majority in 2009. Subsequently, in 2011, the 
rightist Social Democrats and Christian Democrats coalesced to form a post-electoral minimum 
winning coalition.  
Our unit of analysis is the parliamentary question. The dependent variable 
Parliamentary Question Focus is specified as a nominal unordered variable with three 
categories: trustee (0), district (1), and political party (2). Each parliamentary question is 
attributed a value depending on whether the deputy tabled a question focused on her interests 
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as a trustee (0); a question focusing on the district in which she has been elected (1); or a 
question focusing in delivering benefits to the political party (2). 
The empirical measure of focus of representation of each parliamentary question has 
been conducted as follows. To be coded as district focused (1), a parliamentary question has to 
make an explicit and direct reference to a geographic unit in the GHSXW\¶V district. By 
geographic unit we mean either a reference to the district as a whole (e.g. Lisbon) or a direct 
reference to a city or parish in the district (e.g. Sintra or São Domingos de Rana). We have 
used an automated process to match the parliamentary questions with information from the 
National Statistics Office (Instituto Nacional de Estatística), as an official source for districts, 
municipalities, and parishes.3  
Our dependent variable takes the value of 2 if the deputy tables a question to the 
ministry shadowed by the committee in which she sits.4 We build on previous findings on the 
strong connection between labor division within the parliamentary party group and committee 
assignment (Hagevi, 2000). Parties assign members to committees and, in return, the latter will 
be considered experts and have particular duties in that respective policy. In the Portuguese 
legislature, representatives have to specify the departmental ministry to which they want to 
submit their ZULWWHQTXHVWLRQ7KXVLIDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWDEOHVDTXHVWLRQWRWKHµ+HDOWK0LQLVWU\¶
and, at the same time, sits on the Health Committee there is a matching constellation.  
A question takes the value of 0 when deemed as a trustee issue. For analytical purposes, 
we have chosen this as the baseline category of our dependent variable. Trustees works as a 
neutral category against which the other two categories ± district and party ± are compared. In 
the Portuguese system, there is not only a low level of legislative professionalization, but also 
                                                          
3
 :HXVHGD3\WKRQVFULSWWRPDWFKSDUOLDPHQWDU\TXHVWLRQVZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶VGLVWULFWRIorigin. Out of 32011 questions, about 2000 returned 
DPDWFKLQJ UHVXOWRIPRUH WKDQRQHGLVWULFW)RUH[DPSOHDXWRPDWHGPDWFKLQJ UHWXUQHGWZRKLWV IRU µ9LOD5HDO¶DQG µ9LOD5HDO de Santo 
$QWyQLR¶7KHIRUPHULVDFLW\DQGGLVWULFWLQ1RUWKHUQ3RUWXJDOZKLle the latter is a municipality in Southern Portugal. Manual coding was 
used to account for those cases.  
4
 &RPPLWWHHZRUNLVDNH\SDUWRI03V¶SDUOLDPHQWDU\DFWLYLW\LQWKH3RUWXJXHVHOHJLVODWXUHAll MPs are committee members (Leston-
Bandeira 2004: 48-53). See also official records at https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/Paginas/defaultPesquisa.aspx  
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a high turnover. Consequently, many legislators keep private activities whilst in office and 
must nurture those interests to help them in their post-parliamentary career. The trustee 
category encapsulates all questions not related to party nor district. For example, a legislator 
with strong private environmental interests might table several questions on this topic, albeit 
not working directly to serve her party on those matters, or the constituency. Whilst this tells 
us little about the representDWLYH¶V VSHFLILF LQWHUHVWV LW GRHV VLJQDO WKRVH LQVWDQFHV ZKHQ
representatives act according to their own individual interests and judgements, rather than that 
of competing principals between district and party audiences. 
 We include three independent variables of interest. First, we measure Electoral 
Vulnerability, ZKRVHPDLQSXUSRVHLVWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶VUHODWLYHSRVLWLRQLQWKH
electoral list and the safety of that position.5 :HH[SHFWWKLVYDULDEOHWRVKDSHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶
behavioral incentives to focus on party or district. Those representatives with lower electoral 
vulnerability will have more incentives to focus on the party because their chances of being re-
selected and re-elected are higher (Sieberer, 2006). To be sure, in a closed-list proportional 
representation system, representatives with high electoral vulnerability will have incentives to 
ZRUNIRUWKHLUGLVWULFWE\KHLJKWHQLQJWKHSDUW\¶VUHFRUGDVDYHKLFOHIRUFRQVWLWXHQWV¶LQWHUHVWV6 
This variable is measured using a formula presented in André and colleagues (2015), dividing 
WKHVHDWRUGHURIWKHFDQGLGDWHE\WKHSDUW\¶VVHDWWRWDOLQWKHGLVWULFWThe original scale ranges 
from 0 to 1.7 For example, a candidate elected as top of the list (number 1) in a district where 
                                                          
5
 The measure presented in André et al. (2015) is ideal for our purposes for two reasons. First, it uses seats as unit of analysis (and not 
votes), which is useful to facilitate cross-district comparison and to control for the effect of district magnitude. This is particularly important 
in Portugal where magnitude varies from 2 (in Portalegre) to 50 (in Lisbon). Second, this measure is inherently focused on intra-party 
relative vulnerability. In a highly party-constrained partisan environment, we are interested in comparing differences within parties and not 
across parties.  
6
 In Portugal, the capacity to move up the list is limited due to the centralized selection methods of most parties. Consequently, legislators 
have little incentive to nurture the interests of the party leadership. Instead, they focus on activities at their disposal, i.e., fostering the 
HOHFWRUDOFRQQHFWLRQXVLQJSDUOLDPHQWDU\TXHVWLRQVZKLFKFDQPD[LPL]HWKHSDUW\¶VDJJUHJDWHHOHFWRUDOUHVXOWDQG, additionally, have a 
marginal effect in the number of candidates the party elects that can make a difference between being reelected or failing that goal.  
7
 In the Portuguese case, however, the scale can theoretically overcome threshold 1 because of a system of substitutions used routinely. This 
system of substitutions allows representatives whose list position is below the pDUW\¶VQXPEHURIHOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVWRWDNHRIILFHWKDQNV
to deputies being able to suspend their mandate for a period of time, during which the next candidate on the party list takes their seat. For 
example, in 2011, the Left Bloc elected 3 representatives in the Lisbon district, but through a series of substitutions managed to promote 
0DULDQD0RUWiJXDRQHRIWKHSDUW\¶VULVLQJVWDUVWRDSRVLWLRQZKHUHVKHFRXOGWDNHRIILFHGHVSLWHRULJLQDOO\EHLQJIRXUWHenth in the electoral 
list. 
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the party elected 4 representatives, has an electoral vulnerability of 0.25, whilst a candidate 
elected in fourth yields 1.  
 Second, we include Party Size, a measure in percentage of the number of seats that the 
parliamentary party group controls in the plenary. Our third independent variable of interest is 
Election Proximity, a continuous measuring capturing the elapsing time from the day the 
parliamentary question has been tabled until the official day of the next scheduled general 
election.8  
 Our models further include three control variables. First, we measure Seniority by 
counting the number of mandates that representatives have served in the legislature. Previous 
research has suggested that the more mandates representatives have served, the more 
encapsulated they will be from de-selection and electoral defeat, with decreasing levels of 
district service (Fenno, 1978). Second, we introduce a Government dummy, which takes a 
value of 0 if the party is in the opposition and a value of 1 if the party is in government. Our 
expectation is that representatives in opposition parties will have environmental incentives to 
adapt their behavior and to focus more on serving their party. They have to do it because the 
party has fewer human and money resources, as compared to executive parties. Parliamentary 
questions are particularly important to curb information asymmetries and to signal to voters 
the policy agenda of the party (Rasch, 2011). Third, we include a Local Government dummy, 
that takes a value of 1 for legislators with local roles and 0 otherwise.  
 
Results 
Our empirical foray into the foci of representation of representatives in the Portuguese 
legislatures fits a multinomial logit with three specifications (see Table 1). Model 1 includes 
                                                          
8
 There are, of course, cases, for example the 2009 legislature, in which the legislative term is curtailed. However, representatives do not have 
such information when tabling the question. Therefore, our measurement replicates the information level by incorporating uncertainty that 
representatives have at the moment they table the question.  
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all covariates, except for the interaction terms. We start by examining H1, to understand the 
effect of electoral vulnerability on the likelihood for representatives to table questions focused 
on their party. Recall that our expectation is that low electoral vulnerability will increase the 
likelihood that representatives focus on their party by making a question to the ministry 
shadowed by the committee in which they sit. Empirical results support H1. The negative 
coefficient (-0.80, p<0.001) points out that an increase in electoral vulnerability will make 
representatives less likely to focus on tabling question with a party focus, compared with the 
reference category of trustee. True, the coefficient is equally negative for district (the other 
competing principal). However, not only it is smaller, but it also fails to reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance.  
 Turning to H2, according to which we expect party size to have an effect in the 
likelihood of representatives to table a district focused question, empirical evidence suggests 
support for this hypothesis. An increase in party size heightens the likelihood for 
representatives to focus on their district, in that they have incentives to free-ride on their 
FROOHDJXH¶VZRUNEXWDOVREHFDXVHLWEHFRPHVWRRFRVWO\IRUWKHSDUW\OHDGHUVKLSWRPRQLWRU
their behavior. Consequently, in the Portuguese case, representatives from the Socialist and 
Social Democrat Party, whose size typically averages 40 per cent of the plenary floor, have 
more incentives to focus on their district than their counterparts from small parties. 
Representatives from the Communist, the Left Bloc, and the Christian Democratic party groups, 
averaging 10 per cent of the floor, will be more likely to focus on their party. Interestingly, the 
covariate for party size for the Party specification in Model 1 yields a higher coefficient, and 
equally statistically significant, which is a puzzling result. We turn to this in our subsequent 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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 In H3a-H3b we posited that the effect of electoral vulnerability and party size would 
both be moderated by election proximity. Representatives adapt their strategies to help their 
re-election, which becomes a more pressing goal towards the end of the legislative term. Let 
us enquiry first the interaction effect between electoral vulnerability and election proximity, as 
fitted in Model 2. Figure 1 helps us to understand the results for the full range of values in the 
election proximity covariate (Brambor et al., 2006). The left-hand pane in Figure 1 shows the 
likelihood for tabling district focused parliamentary questions across the legislative term for 
representatives in three different levels of electoral vulnerability. Overall, results suggest that 
there are no major changes in the propensity to table a district focused question for the three 
benchmarks of electoral vulnerability displayed here. In other words, representatives with 0.5, 
1, and 1.5 electoral vulnerability levels have relatively constant levels of scoring this question, 
which means that time has a limited, if any, impact in this particular. Looking at the right-hand 
pane, we witness a different story. Evidence suggests that election proximity does have an 
impact in the likelihood that representatives table a party focused question. The less electorally 
vulnerable representatives (.5, solid line) have a 10-point increase, from .21 to .31 in the 
likelihood of serving their party in their parliamentary questions. The more electorally 
vulnerable representatives (1.5, dotted line) have an opposite effect, i.e., election proximity 
makes them to focus less on their party in their parliamentary questions. This evidence supports 
H3a.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 Finally, we investigate the interaction effect between party size and election proximity, 
testing for H3b. Figure 2 displays the marginal effects for the likelihood of representatives of 
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parties of two sizes to table a parliamentary question focusing on their district (left-pane) or in 
their party (right-pane).9  On the left-pane, evidence suggests that representatives in large 
parties (40 per cent of the plenary seats) have a decreasing activity in terms of the number of 
questions tabled focusing on their district. There is a 4-points decrease, from .12 to .08, in the 
likelihood of focusing on their district from the beginning of the legislative term until the end. 
6PDOOSDUWLHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVSHUFHQWRIWKHSOHQDU\VHDWVKDYHDPRUHVWDEOHEHKDYLRU
with only a small change in their likelihood to focus on their district in their questions. Turning 
to the right-hand pane, we see that representatives in both small and large parties have a similar 
pattern: there is an increase in the likelihood of tabling a question focusing on the party as 
election day is near. The slope, however, is steeper for large parties, with a .09-points increase, 
from .69 to .78. For small parties the change accounts only to about .03-points increase, 
from .21 to .24. Overall, evidence does not support H3b. On the contrary, large SDUWLHV¶
representatives focus less on their district as election day approaches.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 Our models are robust to the inclusion of control covariates. Seniority has a negative 
effect for the likelihood of tabling parliamentary questions for both district and party, which 
VHHPVWRSRLQWRXWWKDWLQOLQHZLWK)HQQR¶VDUJXPHQWrepresentatives become more 
trustee-style the more senior they are. ,QOLQHZLWK5DVFK¶VILQGLQJVIRU1RUZD\RXU
results also show that being in government decreases the likelihood of representatives to table 
a party focused parliamentary question. In substantive terms, this means that opposition 
representatives need to make use of their committee expertise and to ask more questions to the 
                                                          
9
 We plot only the effects for parties with 10 and 40 per cent of the seats, which corresponds to the median in the distribution of size. In the 
Portuguese legislature, political parties can be divided into two groups. The Socialists (PS) and the Social Democrats (PSD), which historically 
have around 35-45 per cent of the seats. The Communists (PCP-PEV), the Left Bloc (BE), and the Christian Democrats (CDS-PP) represent 
traditionally between 8-12 per cent. 
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corresponding ministry on the topic mainly to curb information asymmetry between the 
executive and the opposition. Finally, our results show that cumul des mandats has a positive 
effect across the board. Representatives with local government positions have a higher 
likelihood of tabling questions for both their party and their district. This is a puzzling result, 
which deserve further research.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have explored how parliamentary questions might be used to unveil 
the focus of representation of representatives in Portugal. We were motivated by a theoretical 
and empirical puzzle: is there leeway for representatives to focus on a principal other than their 
party in a highly institutionally constrained environment? Additionally, we wanted to address 
a question that has been overlooked in the extant literature on parliamentary questions: do 
representatives have a time-constant representation focus or do they adapt their focus 
depending on election proximity? Using an original dataset covering the 2005-2015 
legislatures in Portugal, this paper makes a contribution to the literature by highlighting the 
importance of including time into our models of parliamentary questioning.  
Our main overall contribution for the literature is that representation focus is not static 
over time. Rather, evidence suggests that representatives are strategic and adapt their behavior 
accordingly as election day approximates. The effect of time differs, however, depending on 
electoral vulnerability and party size.  
First, our empirical evidence suggests that representatives with low electoral 
vulnerability will be more focused in serving their party towards the end of the legislative term. 
In substantive terms, this means that frontbenchers of the party (with low electoral vulnerability) 
will be working towards retrieving as much information as possible to use during the electoral 
campaign. Conversely, representatives with high electoral vulnerability are more likely to focus 
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on their district. Considering Portuguese institutional setting, with a closed-list proportional 
representation, those representatives have these incentives because they are the most important 
to heighten the part\¶VFROOHFWLYHODEHO DQGWRERRVWWKHDJJUHJDWHUHVXOWRIWKHSDUW\¶VOLVW, which 
will ultimately be decisive for their (re)election due to the uncertainty of the outcome.  
Second, the size of the party has an impact in the labor division, which, in turn, makes 
representatives adapt their behavior during the legislative term. Evidence points out that in 
large parties (with roughly 40 per cent of seats), representatives have decreasing incentives to 
table questions focusing on their district. This suggests that the numerous backbenchers in large 
parties are less likely to shirk and free-ride at the end of the legislative term than at the 
beginning. Such result bodes well with our previous finding on electoral vulnerability, in that 
backbenchers are more likely to be electorally vulnerable. In contrast, representatives of small 
parties, where the inherently small number of members makes for a more blurred distinction 
between frontbenchers and backbenchers, tend to have a more stable behavior over the 
legislative term.  
Our results present some limitations and remaining puzzles requiring further research. 
Specifically, more work should be put into understanding how party size and organization 
impacts individual incentives in parliamentary questions. Also, comparative work should help 
us shed light on the impact of electoral systems for questioning activity.  
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Table 1: Determinants of Parliamentary Question Focus in the Portuguese Legislature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient entries estimated with multinomial logit regression. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed). 
A  control variable for party fixed-effects is included in the model but not displayed.
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
District Party District Party District Party 
        
Electoral Vulnerability 
 
-0.02                
(0.25) 
-0.80***             
(0.58) 
-0.12*               
(0.04) 
-1.15***             
(-0.10) 
-0.02                
(0.03) 
-0.80***             
(-0.06) 
        
Party Size 
 
0.04***             
(0.01) 
0.12***             
(0.01) 
0.02***             
(0.01) 
0.05***             
(0.03) 
0.03***             
(0.01) 
0.13***             
(0.01) 
        
Election Proximity 
 
0.01                
(2.00) 
0.01***             
(0.01) 
0.01***             
(2.98) 
0.01***             
(0.01) 
0.01                
(0.01) 
0.01**              
(0.01) 
        
Electoral Vulnerability*Election 
Proximity 
   
-0.01***             
(0.01) 
-0.01***             
(-0.01) 
  
        
Party Size*Election Proximity 
     
-4.55*               
(2.33) 
6.72**              
(2.53) 
        
Seniority 
 
-0.10***             
(0.01) 
-0.09***             
(-0.01) 
-0.10***             
(0.01) 
-0.08***             
(0.01) 
-0.10***            
(0.01) 
-0.09***             
(-0.01) 
        
Government 
 
0.01                
(0.11) 
-1.41***             
(0.14) 
0.01                
(0.11) 
-1.36***             
(0.13) 
0.01                
(0.12) 
-1.40***             
(-0.14) 
        
Local Government 
 
0.38***             
(0.03) 
0.42***             
(0.03) 
.39***              
(0.33) 
0.45***             
(0.35) 
0.38***             
(0.32) 
0.42***             
(0.03) 
        
Intercept 
 
-2.09***             
(0.28) 
-4.24***             
(0.30) 
-1.99***             
(0.29) 
-0.45***             
(0.35) 
-1.98***            
(-0.29) 
-4.33***             
(0.30) 
N 
 
32011 32011 32011 
BIC   -2753.85 -2779.78 -2749.67 
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Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Electoral Vulnerability moderated by Election Proximity 
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Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Party Size moderated by Election Proximity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
